This paper examines the relationship between state party politics and the economic performance of the state over six four-year periods covering the years 1978 to 2002. Novel features include that the study examines the role of party control in a panel, it examines the effects of political competitiveness, measures effects not only on income variables but also on employment, tax, and spending policies, infrastructure investment, and quality of life variables.
I.

Introduction
Numerous studies address the effect of economic conditions on election outcomes.
Several focus on presidential elections (Fair, 1978; Meltzer and Vellrath, 1975; Abrams and Settle, 1978) , and others on congressional elections (Bennett and Wiseman, 1991; Zupan, 1991; Kramer, 1971; Stigler, 1973) . Other studies examine gubernatorial elections (Peltzman, 1987; Adams and Kenny, 1989) . The general approach in these cases was to associate the votes for the incumbent party (or candidate) with economic performance, especially the immediate period preceding the election. Intuitively, we expected that "good" economic performance rewards the incumbent party.
Very few, however, study the question of whether it makes any difference which party is in power, or whether political competitiveness itself has an effect on state outcomes. Regarding the effect of party control, two exceptions are papers by Dion (1993 and .
In the first one, the authors asked "…if it matters which party forms the government." These authors look at the effect of party on government size, that is, how much government spends. 1 In the second, they test the effect of the party on the rate of increase in government's spending.
Their sample consists of national governments. Winters (1976) investigated the effect of the party on state government size. Brace (1989) raised the question as we do, "…how state politics, however defined, might influence state economies"; his work has shown the importance of the national markets on state performance and finds a general irrelevance of state politics and policies. According to findings of Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) , state "political parties do not have a pronounced effect on overall levels of expenditure, but do influence the composition of spending" (p. 383). Levitt and Poterba (1999) investigate "…the effect of representation on an economic outcome…" In their case they study the effect of the political party of the state governor on welfare spending.
The present study focuses on the effect of party composition and political competition on the economic outcomes of states including those intermediate state practices that can affect either state income or the well-being of its citizens. This takes the investigation "behind the scenes" to examine the mechanisms in comparison to the public stereotypes of the parties: Do Democrats reduce the unemployment rate, invest more in public schooling, highways, do they raise tax rates? Do Republicans foster a better and safer quality of life, are they more business friendly?
The advantage of using the state as the unit of observation is that it provides a sample large enough to test several hypotheses. 2 Also, the economic aspects of state elections might be more important to individual's economic lives than national elections if only because national elections usually are dominated by non-economic issues such as foreign policy and national security.
However, a disadvantage arises in that state governments have relatively little control of state income performance, despite campaign rhetoric. The present framework requires that they have at least in principle, the power to influence state outcomes. We also present evidence on the question: Does the performance of the state economy depend to a substantial extent on developments occurring outside the state borders, i.e., on the regional or national level. 3 However, even though state governments print no money nor protect their borders against competition from other states and countries, they still enjoy enough power in principle to have an influence on their voters' economic well being to some extent. Examples of policies include: 1) the power to tax (positive and negative), 2) the decisions on what to spend budget money and how much, 3) the borrowing of money for long-term investments, 4) the development of state infrastructure, 5) the regulation of resources, and 6) the control over the state bureaucracy. According to Hansen (1999) , "Since the 1970s state governors have claim to a more active role for themselves in state economic development (p. 170)." This is not to say that the state can determine its own economic destiny by itself. Nevertheless, the state government can control the magnitude of the spillover effect from the regional and national economies to the state economy. 5 High state taxes and inefficient bureaucracy may slow down and weaken the spillover effect of growing national economy, whereas investment in infrastructure and efficient bureaucracy can bring more economic development to the state.
Since in almost all states, the governor's term lasts four years, 6 we will consider the governor to be accountable for the state economic performance over a period of four to eight years following the governor's term. These lags are chosen to allow time for the government's policies to have effect.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a background discussion of prior empirical work. The third section describes the data and develops the empirical model. The fourth section contains the reports of the regression estimates and the analyses. The last section offers a summary and conclusions.
II. Background Discussion and Empirical Evidence
The competition over the control of state government takes place mainly over changes in the representation of the two major parties: the Democratic and the Republican parties. As stated by Morehouse (1981) , "The single most important factor in state politics is the political party." Winters (1976) adds to this, "We define our candidates in party terms and our issues in party terms." 7 The role political parties play in the political process according to Jones and Hudson (1998) is to "…reduce the 'transaction costs' of electoral participation. Political parties provide a low cost signal of the candidate's policies and personal characteristics and in this way reduce voter's information costs (p. 175)." Greene and Nelson (1998) hypothesize that this is done because the "…party performs as an ideological label (p. 4)." The effect of the party composition of government on policies is the subject of several studies. Winters (1976) looks at the difference between the two parties regarding the distribution of tax burden and spending benefits. Dion (1993 and test the effect of the party composition of government on government size as well as the nature of the budget spending. Their findings suggest that in a government controlled by the left, the rate of growth of spending is higher as compared to a government controlled by the right (1996: 517). Morehouse (1981) argues that, "It is not possible to understand the differences in the way states carry out the process of government without understanding the type of party whose representatives are making decisions that affect the health, education, and welfare of its citizens." All these studies are concentrated on the differences in policies due to the party composition of the government.
It is reasonable to expect that the two parties favor "good" economic performance, that is, economic growth, full employment, low taxes and so on. 8 On many occasions, however, it is impossible to achieve all economic goals at the same time, so the government must choose among the different goals. The main differences between the two parties are in the choices that they make, that is, their differences in priorities. Hibbes (1987) suggests that the Democrats favor a high growth rate and low unemployment and Republicans are more concerned with the risk of inflation. Thus, "Democratic administrations are more likely than Republican ones to run the risk of higher inflation rates in order to pursue expansive policies designed to yield lower unemployment and extra growth (p. 218)." 9 A similar view was expressed by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998. 11 Economic variables-GSP, personal income, employment, unemployment-are treated as dependent variables in regression equations applied to test political effects on key economic outcomes, often the focus of state political campaigns. As with all variables in the study, the names and extended definitions and the sources for these variables are provided in the Appendix. Political variables include: political party of governor, party majority in state house and senate, as well as the percentage vote for the Democrat in the most recent presidential election. Quality of life variables include: poverty rate, infant mortality rate, crime rate, and social capital. The social capital rating for each state is provided to this study from a paper on state health issues (Folland, 2007 (Folland, , 2006 . Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
In panel regression with fixed effects and period effects, we first apply three variables as measures of economic performance: 1) the rate of growth of real gross state product; 2) GSP per capita and 3) personal income per capita. Political control variables are lagged one period, giving party effects on state outcomes needed time to bear fruit (Adams and Kenny, 1989) . Some policy effects take much longer; for example, investment in infrastructure such as highway construction and education; in that case, we test for party effects directly on measures of investment in highway and two education variables.
Party effects, if they exist, require the party's control of the governorship and/or the house and senate of the state. Several measures will be tested to explore these possibilities.
When the governorship is controlled by the Democrats, we identify a corresponding variable (Democratic Governor) to equal one; zero when the governorship is controlled by the As we analyze the findings, we will look for corroborating or contrasting cases vs. a vs.
popular reputations of the parties, each condensed out of perceptions of the parties in the media.
Democrats by reputation promote government spending, favor K-12 spending, support unions, promote aid to the poor and support social freedoms. Republicans by the same media, are more business friendly, seek to cut taxes and promote traditional social values.
Nevertheless we propose that alternative views may be more realistic. Both Democratic and Republican parties are composed of coalitions that are sometimes at odds within the Party.
Republican advocates of free markets are often at odds with pro-business Republicans who may have strong ties to local firms or industries. Religious and moral issue advocates among
Republicans may expend effort on policies that work to place limits on social behaviors, without any economic payoff. Yet, political campaigns often demand that both candidates claim to effectively address economic progress, the campaign priorities that prevail may not be the genuine priorities for some party subgroups.
Democrats similarly collect disparate groups: industrial unions, teachers, immigrants, and both pro-market advocates as well as globalization skeptics. Like their Republican opponents, when billfold issues dominate a campaign, the Democrats must demonstrate that they are at least as competent as the opposition. Since both parties compete for the same prize, and since both parties have member groups who have interests that may conflict with economic progress, the result may become a muddling through during which there may be little real difference between the parties regarding genuine state economic progress.
We entered this research as agnostics on these possible outcomes. Previous studies on the subject, like Dion (1993 and , found that government tends to spend more when it is controlled by a politically left party as compared to a government which controlled by a politically right party. Following this line of thought one might hypothesize that a state controlled by the Democrats tends to have a bigger government.
This hypothesis correlates with the political legend that Democrats are the party of "tax and spend". But problems clearly arise with this view. Taxes fund infrastructure investment, thus fueling economic growth, but they also pay for growing consumer tastes for public amenities.
Also it is possible that they fund government waste. (2000) for the year 1994 and was extended back to 1976 and made available to this study in work by Folland (2007) . It represents a factor analytic combination of survey results regarding people's views of the community, their rate of sociable interchange, and their degree of participation in community activities. The results in Table 7 highlight the role of Political Competitiveness, which provides a significant beneficial effect in most cases (the Crime Rate is the exception). The condition indices test more directly for multicolinearity. Two sets of regressors apply here, the version in percent changes and the version in levels. In the first case, the condition index is 12.2, indicating low levels of dependency. The second case, in which percentage change variables are converted to levels, the condition index is 38.8, a moderate level. We also derived the variance decomposition proportions (see Judge et al., 1985) , so as to address whether the party variables of interest were involved in the weak dependencies. There was only an indication that the Democratic Governor variable and the %Unionized variable were involved in a linear relationship indicated by one of the characteristic roots. However, these two were the only variables involved in that root, and their pairwise correlation is extraordinarily small at 0.006. The most plausibly omitted variables should they exist in this case, would most likely be measures of social, cultural, and local economic resources. For example, recent presidential elections emphasized the political distinction between urban and rural areas. The advantage of using a panel for the present research is that all of these variables are unlikely to have changed much over the range of periods studied. Thus the fixed effects with period effects model is appropriate and accounts in principle for many such characteristics of the states.
V. Summary and Conclusion
The voters' decision regarding what party should run their state government for the next four years makes little difference to the state economic performance. State policies of taxing and spending are not a reliable indicator for distinguishing which party is in control. Quality of life indicators show no significant response to Democrats versus Republicans. In contrast, we find that political competition shows some response, as it relates positively to variables like employment per capita and negatively to the poverty rate and infant mortality rate. These results for political party raise the question of: Why? Why does the particular party in control make so little difference on state outcomes?
One possible answer, of course, is that of those economists who believe that state economic performance cannot be determined by the state government arguing that the state government's ability to conduct an independent fiscal policy is limited by the fact that they can not print money, and the state is an open economy with free mobility of resources. However, we believe that the state has tools of investment and economic environment to substantially influence its economic development. We argue instead that the economic policy of the state depends on the choices of politicians but simply does not depend on party line. The ideologies of the two major parties are certainly different, yet, whichever party gains power is forced to face reality, that is, the existing perceptions of the voting public. The actual policies come to be not so much based on the party ideology but tend to depend more on the politic and economic market forces. In contested elections, there may not be much room to manipulate. Nevertheless it is still possible for different groups to realize economic gains solely because their party won the election. The coalitions of interest groups expect their party's candidate to do better for the state, but more importantly, to improve their own well being.
A related view is that the political competition itself that is helpful. In this view, competition hones the policy skills of both parties, but the party that survives the competition with the voters is itself an outcome greatly affected by chance. Finally we note that neither party control nor political competition work to improve growth in GSP, it may be that this negative result stems from both state politicians' limited policy ability in this area of endeavor but also from the limited tools by which any state can improve its state product. 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 were then averaged. The data years 1978 and 1982 were deleted because they lacked the required lagged values. %ΔGSP Net is the percentage change in gross state product net of the mean percentage change within its region. Putnam (2000) and extended in a study by Folland (2007) .
